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Abstract 
In 2005-08, over a dozen put warrants traded in China went so deep out of the money 
that they were certain to expire worthless. Nonetheless, each warrant was traded nearly 
three times each day at substantially inflated prices. This bubble is unique, because the 
underlying stock prices make the zero warrant fundamentals publicly observable. We find 
evidence supporting the resale option theory of bubbles: investors overpay for a warrant 
hoping to resell it at an even higher price to a greater fool. Our study confirms key findings 
of the experimental bubble literature and provides useful implications for market 
development. 
 
1   Introduction  
Asset price bubbles, i.e., asset prices that exceed assets’ fundamental values, have always 
been a subject of interest to economists.  However, clear identification of a price bubble is 
challenging due to the difficulty of measuring an asset’s fundamental value. There is an open 
debate about whether each historical episode constitutes a bubble.  For example, Garber (2000) 
proposes market fundamental explanations for three famous bubbles, the Dutch tulip mania 
(1634-37), the Mississippi bubble (1719-20) and the closely connected South Sea bubble (1720). 
Pastor and Veronesi (2006) challenge the existence of an Internet bubble in the late 1990s. The 
difficulty of measuring asset fundamentals makes it even more challenging to analyze economic 
mechanisms that drive up price bubbles. Instead, the academic literature heavily relies on 
laboratory settings to study asset bubbles.  
In this paper, we use a unique data sample from China’s warrants market to study asset price 
bubbles. In 2005-08, several Chinese companies issued put warrants with long maturities ranging 
from 9 months to 2 years. These warrants give their holders the right to sell the issuing 
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companies’ stocks at predetermined strike prices during a pre-specified exercise period. The 
dramatic stock market runup in China between 2005 and 2007 pushed most of these put warrants 
so deep out of the money that they were certain to expire worthless.  However, they had become 
targets of frenzied speculation, which generated a spectacular bubble as dramatic as, if not more 
than, any historical bubble episode.  For each warrant, billions of Yuan traded with an average 
daily turnover rate close to 300%, and at substantially inflated prices.  Several features make 
these warrants particularly appealing for analyzing bubbles: First, we can reliably measure the 
warrants’ fundamental values to be zero using the underlying stock prices; second, the publicly 
observable stock prices also make the zero warrant fundamentals observable to all market 
participants; and third, these warrants have a predetermined finite maturity. These features so far 
are available only in laboratory environments. This data sample thus allows us to examine 
various bubble mechanisms and to confirm some key findings of the experimental studies.  
We analyze the market dynamics of all of the 16 put warrants with expiration dates before 
May 2008. We use a number of measures to quantify the warrants' fundamental values. One of 
such measures is based on the celebrated Black-Scholes model. Each warrant had a period in 
which its Black-Scholes value dropped to economically negligible levels below half of the 
minimum trading tick of 0.1 penny. While one might argue that the Black-Scholes model may 
not be accurate in measuring fundamental values of the Chinese warrants, a Black-Scholes value 
of less than 0.05 penny is a reliable indication that the warrant only has a tiny probability, if any, 
of being in the money at expiration and that it has virtually no value. The length of the zero-
fundamental period ranges from a minimum of 6 trading days to a maximum of 165 trading days, 
with an average of 54 trading days per warrant. Despite its zero fundamental value in the period, 
each warrant had been traded at substantially higher prices with an average of 1.00 Yuan. In 
addition, the prices varied considerably across warrants.  
We also construct a less model-specific upper bound for the put warrants’ fundamental 
values.  Stock price in China is allowed to drop by no more than 10% each day. Thus, the current 
stock price implies a lower bound on the future stock price before the warrant expiration, or 
equivalently, an upper bound on the payoff from the put warrant. Among the 16 put warrants in 
our data, 13 had violated this fundamental upper bound for a period averaging 6 days.  
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Furthermore, two of the put warrants, HuaLing and WuLiang, had prices higher than their 
strike prices, an even more relaxed fundamental upper bound which can be realized only if the 
underlying stock prices drop to zero before the warrant expiration.  
Taken together, the fact that the warrant prices substantially exceeded not only the 
fundamental values implied by the Black-Scholes model, but also the model-free upper bounds, 
leaves no doubt that there was a bubble in the warrant prices.  Like many historical bubble 
episodes, the warrants bubble was accompanied by a trading frenzy and by extraordinary price 
volatility. Each warrant in its zero-fundamental period had an average daily turnover rate of 
291%, an average daily volume of 1.26 billion Yuan, and an average return volatility of 248% 
per annum. On an extreme day, the ZhaoHang put warrant had a volume of 45.68 billion Yuan 
(roughly 7 billion dollars) even though the warrant was fundamentally worthless. On their last 
trading day, these warrants had an average turnover rate of 1,235% in four hours of trading time, 
which means about 100% turnover every 20 minutes!  
Because of the restrictive legal ban on short-selling financial securities (including warrants) 
in China, smart investors cannot arbitrage the bubble and correct the price. However, it is more 
difficult to understand the origin of the bubble—the mechanism that drives investors to trade and 
to pay inflated prices. Because these put warrants have only a small and statistically insignificant 
return correlation with the underlying stocks in their zero-fundamental period, it is difficult to 
argue that investors trade these warrants to hedge the underlying stocks. There is also little 
evidence of positive skewness in the warrant returns to support the hypothesis that investors treat 
these warrants as lottery tickets (Barberis and Huang, 2008). The finite maturity of the warrants 
also prevents a rational bubble suggested by Blanchard and Watson (1983), who show that a 
rational bubble can exist for an asset with an infinite life as long as the bubble is expected to 
grow at a rate equal to the discount rate. The publicly observable warrants fundamentals also rule 
out rational finite bubbles caused by asymmetric information about asset fundamentals, e.g., 
Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993).  
The stringent short-sales restriction and the likely presence of heterogeneous investors make 
the resale option theory of bubbles, e.g., Harrison and Kreps (1978), Morris (1996), Scheinkman 
and Xiong (2003), and Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006), particularly relevant for explaining 
the warrants bubble. Warrant contracts are new to many Chinese investors. Some investors have 
been trading the warrants without a complete understanding of the warrant contracts, while some 
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others well understand the contracts and the market. Those investors who understand the 
presence of such investor heterogeneity, constrained by the restriction on short-selling, are likely 
willing to pay an overvalued price for a warrant because they expect to sell it at an even higher 
price later to a “greater fool”. 
The resale option theory provides several testable predictions on the size of price bubble 
both across maturity and across warrants. The theory implies that when less trading time 
remains, there are fewer resale opportunities and therefore a smaller price bubble. This 
implication is consistent with a pronounced, gradually declining trend in the warrant prices.  The 
resale option theory also predicts that the size of a price bubble is positively related to trading 
volume and return volatility, and negatively related to asset float (i.e., number of tradable 
shares). The more investors disagree about future price movement, the more intensively they 
trade with each other, and, at the same time, the more they are willing to pay for the resale 
option. When the asset return is more volatile, investors also tend to disagree more, which in turn 
makes the bubble larger. When investors have a limited risk-bearing capacity and when there is a 
larger asset float, investors expect that it takes a more optimistic belief of the future greater fool 
to make a profit, thus leading to a smaller bubble. Our panel regression analysis provides 
evidence supporting these predictions. 
In analyzing the time-series dynamics of the warrants bubble, we also find evidence of 
positive feedback to past warrant returns in both warrant returns and turnover changes. Despite 
the positive feedback in warrant returns, it is not profitable on the margin to ride the bubble by 
buying recent winners, because the pronounced downward price trend caused by the approaching 
warrant maturity offsets the upward short-term price momentum created by positive past returns. 
Consistent with Brunnermeier and Nagel (2004), this result suggests that smart investors likely 
have been actively riding the bubble and, by doing so, have eliminated additional opportunities 
for such momentum trades. 
The warrants bubble shows that even when asset fundamentals are easy to measure, a bubble 
could arise as long as short-sales are constrained and there exist heterogeneous investors. This 
bubble mechanism sheds light on other more complicated bubble episodes, including the recent 
housing bubble across many regions in the U.S. Our study compliments the existing evidence on 
speculative bubbles, e.g., Shiller (2000),  Cochrane (2003), Lamont and Thaler (2003), Ofek and 
Richardson (2003), and Hong and Stein (2007).      
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By analyzing a field data sample, our study confirms a key finding of the experimental 
studies that bubbles could arise even when asset payoffs are publicly observable. This 
phenomenon was initially discovered by Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) and later 
replicated by many other studies, e.g., Porter and Smith (1995), Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001),  
Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore (2005), Ackert, et al (2006), Haruvy and Noussair (2006), 
Hirota and Sunder (2007), Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007), and Hussam, Porter and Smith 
(2008), under various treatments. Our study also corroborates with these studies in highlighting 
investor heterogeneity and short-sales constraints as the key drivers of asset bubbles. In addition, 
our study points out the large endogenous inflow of inexperienced investors during market 
booms, which is often missed by experimental studies with a fixed set of subjects, as an 
additional factor in prolonged price bubbles. 
The warrants bubble, which occurred during the early stage of China’s development of its 
derivatives markets, also offers an important implication for financial market development: 
granting too much trading capacity to investors before they become experienced could lead to the 
illusion of control and therefore excessive speculation. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief introduction of China’s 
warrants market. Section 3 describes the speculative bubble in the market. We examine the 
driving mechanism of the warrants bubble in Section 4. Section 5 compares the warrants bubble 
to the bubbles in experimental markets, and Section 6 discusses the implications for financial 
market development. Finally, we conclude in Section 7.  
2  China’s Warrants Market 
Despite China’s rapid economic growth in the past 30 years, its financial markets are still in 
development. Chinese investors have no alternative investment choices besides stocks. Even in 
the stock market, they face stringent constraints on short-selling and margin buying. To provide 
more investment choices, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) introduced a 
small number of warrants starting in August 2005 as an initial step to open up the financial 
derivatives markets.
1 Warrants are essentially financial options issued by publicly listed firms. 
                                                 
1 The central government had been deeply worried about the speculative nature of derivatives markets since 1995, 
when a notorious manipulation scandal by a security firm in the Treasury bond futures market caused the 
government to close out all financial derivatives markets.  The government’s share reform in 2005 provided a good 
opportunity for the CSRC to reintroduce financial derivatives to the market, without being rejected by the central 
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There are two basic types. A call warrant gives its holder the right to buy stock from the issuing 
firm at a predetermined strike price during a pre-specified exercise period, while a put warrant 
gives its holder the right to sell stock back to the issuing firm.  Both call and put warrants derive 
their values from the underlying stock price: the value of a call warrant increases with the stock 
price, while that of a put warrant decreases.   
By May 2008, 18 put warrants and 29 call warrants had been issued to the public. Among 
them, 32 were traded in the Shanghai Stock Exchange and 15 in the Shenzhen Stock Exchange.   
To maintain the usual advantages of financial derivatives for hedging and speculation 
purposes, the CSRC has provided a more trading-friendly environment for the warrants market 
than for the stock market, which is reflected in several dimensions.  First, stock trading is subject 
to the so called “T+1” rule, which requires investors to hold their stocks for at least one day 
before selling. Warrants trading is subject to the “T+0” rule, which allows investors to sell 
warrants they purchase earlier on the same day. As a result, investors can pursue day-trading 
strategies in warrants but not in stocks.   
Second, investors incur a lower transaction cost when trading warrants.  When trading 
stocks (either buying or selling), investors pay a stamp tax to the government, a registration fee 
to the stock exchange, and a brokerage fee.  The stamp tax is determined by a flat percentage of 
the total proceeds. The tax rate has changed several times in the past, ranging from 0.1% to 
0.3%.  The registration fee is 0.1% of the total proceeds. The trading commission is negotiable 
with brokers and is capped at 0.3% of the total proceeds.  Investors are exempted from paying 
any stamp tax and registration fee when trading warrants. They still pay a brokerage fee, which is 
also negotiable and is capped at 0.3% of the total proceeds.  Because of the large volume in the 
warrants market, brokers usually charge a lower trading commission on warrants than on stocks.  
                                                                                                                                                             
government.  Before the reform, most shares (about two thirds) of public firms were owned either directly by the 
government or indirectly by its local agencies.  These shares were restricted from trading in the public market.  
Realizing that bureaucrats and government agents are not suitable for the responsibility of enforcing governance of 
public firms, in 2005 the central government announced a plan to convert its large non-tradable share holdings into 
tradable shares and eventually to float them in the market.  However, this plan had encountered resistance from 
investors who worried that the dramatic increase in the number of freely tradable shares would depress share prices 
and cause large losses in their portfolios.  To persuade the public to accept the share reform plan, the government 
decided to compensate investors of the floating shares for their potential losses.  Seizing this opportunity, the CSRC 
allowed some firms involved in the share reform to issue warrants as part of their compensation packages to the 
public investors.      
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Third, warrants have a wider daily price change limit.  The CSRC imposes a 10% limit on 
daily price increase or decrease of any stock traded on the two stock exchanges. Once the price 
of a stock rises or falls by 10% relative to the previous day’s closing price, the trading of this 
stock is halted for the day. With the large volatility in China’s stock market, individual stocks 
often hit their daily price-change limit.  The daily permissible price increase (decrease) of a 
warrant in Yuan is equal to the daily permissible price increase (decrease) of the underlying 
stock in Yuan, multiplied by 125% and the warrant’s exercise ratio.
2  Since a warrant usually has 
a high leverage ratio, its price-change limit is much wider in percentage terms than the limit on 
the underlying stocks.  In practice, warrants seldom hit their daily price-change limit despite their 
dramatic price volatility, which we will discuss in the next section.  
Despite the goodwill of the CSRC in providing a friendly environment for investors to use 
warrants as a tool to hedge or speculate on the underlying stocks, the warrants market has 
attracted a speculative frenzy, as we will describe in the next section.   
Finally, it is important to note that investors are prohibited by law from short-selling stocks 
or warrants in China.  The severe short-sales constraint makes it impossible for investors to 
arbitrage any stock or warrant’s overvaluation relative to its fundamental.  Meanwhile, 
companies cannot easily arbitrage overvaluation of their warrants by issuing more warrants 
because new issuance is subject to restrictive quota constraints set by the central government.   
The Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE), one of the two main stock exchanges, had 
experimented with a limited shorting mechanism for the SHSE-traded warrants by allowing a 
group of designated brokerage firms to create additional shares of the SHSE-traded warrants. 
When a designated firm wants to create more shares of a warrant, it must obtain approval from 
the SHSE, which weighs a set of unwritten factors in making the decision.
3 The created warrants 
                                                 
2 For example, consider NanHang put warrant on November 2, 2007. On the previous trading day, the warrant’s 
closing price was 1.122 Yuan and the underlying NanHang stock’s closing price was 21.61 Yuan. The warrant had 
an exercise ratio of 0.5, i.e., one share of the warrant gave its holder the right to sell 0.5 share of NanHang stock to 
the issuing firm. With the 10% daily price change limit, the price of NanHang stock was allowed to increase or 
decrease by 2.16 Yuan on this day. Then, the warrant price was allowed to increase or decrease by 
2.16×125%×0.5=1.35 Yuan, which corresponded to 120% of the warrant’s closing price from the previous day.      
3 The SHSE could not allow the brokerage firms to issue stock-settled put warrants at a quantity substantially more 
than the floating shares of the firm stocks, because otherwise the warrant holders won’t be able to exercise their in-
the-money put warrants at expiration. The SHSE had also faced enormous public pressure and criticism after these 
warrants expired out of the money, which caused many individual investors to lose money while the brokerage firms 
to make large profits from issuing the warrants.    
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are traded in the market undistinguished from the original warrants, and the firm can buy back 
warrants from the market to offset its earlier creation.
4 The creation mechanism caused the 
floating shares of the SHSE warrants to change over time, but it did not eliminate the 
overvaluation of these warrants because of the program’s limited scope. 
3  The Price Bubble in Put Warrants 
We obtain data on all of the 16 put warrants with expiration date before May 2008 from the 
GTA data company.
5 Our data include the initial contract terms and later contract modifications 
(such as adjustments for stock splits), daily price information (open, close, high, and low), daily 
trading volume, intraday transactions (time, price and quantity), and warrant exercises. We also 
substitute the information about the underlying stocks from the Wharton Research Data Services 
(WRDS) database. 
3.1  The WuLiang Put Warrant 
The WuLiang put warrant provides a vivid example of the bubble in the Chinese warrants 
market.  On April 3, 2006, WuLiangYe Corporation, a liquor producer in China, issued 313 
million shares of put warrants on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange. The warrant has a maturity of 
two years with expiration date of April 2, 2008.  Investors are allowed to freely trade the warrant 
before the last trading date of March 26, 2008. After the last trading day, warrant holders have 
five business days between March 27, 2008 and April 2, 2008 to exercise the warrant.  The put 
warrant was issued in the money with an initial stock price of 7.11 Yuan per share and a strike 
price of 7.96 Yuan per share.  At issuance, each share of the warrant gives its holder the right to 
sell one share of WuLiang stock to WuLiangYe Corporation during the exercise period.  We call 
this number the warrant’s exercise ratio. The warrant is adjusted for any stock split and dividend 
payout during its life. After such adjustments, the warrant’s strike price became 5.627 Yuan per 
share, and its exercise ratio became 1.402 before expiration. 
Figure 1 plots the daily closing prices of WuLiang stock and the put warrant during its 
lifetime.
6   The WuLiang stock price increased from 7.11 Yuan on April 3, 2006 to a peak of 
71.56 Yuan on October 15, 2007, and then retreated to around 26 Yuan when the warrant 
                                                 
4 Creations and cancellations are publicly disclosed by the SHSE within the same day. 
5 The same company supplies the Chinese stock market data to the WRDS database, which is commonly used in the 
finance academic community.  
6 WuLiang stock had a stock split during this period.  Figure 1 is based on the pre-split share unit. 
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expired.  While the put warrant was initially issued in the money, the big run up of WuLiang 
stock price soon pushed the put warrant out of money after two weeks, and it never came back in 
the money.  Surprisingly, the figure also suggests a positive price comovement between the put 
warrant and its underlying stock: the warrant price moved up with the stock price from an initial 
price of 0.99 Yuan to as high as 8.15 Yuan in June 2007 and only gradually fell back to one 
penny at the last minute of the last trading day.  
 
Figure 1. WuLiang put warrant prices 
This figure shows the daily closing prices of WuLiang stock and its put warrant, along with WuLiang 
warrant's strike price, upper bound of its fundamental value assuming WuLiang stock price drops 10% 
every day before expiration (maximum allowed per day in China’s stock market), and its Black-Scholes 
price using WuLiang stock’s previous one-year rolling daily return volatility. 















































Was there a bubble in the WuLiang put warrant price?  The warrant’s fundamental value is 
determined by the price and return volatility of the underlying WuLiang stock.  The celebrated 
Black-Scholes model provides a convenient tool to estimate the warrant’s fundamental value.  
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We use WuLiang stock’s daily closing price and previous one-year rolling daily return volatility 
to compute the warrant’s Black-Scholes value.
7   Figure 1 also plots the daily Black-Scholes 
value together with the market price.  The warrant was traded at prices above the Black-Scholes 
value throughout its life, except for a brief two-week period in the beginning.  For convenience 
of discussion, we say that the warrant price is zero if it falls below an economically negligible 
level, marked at 0.05 penny (half of the minimum trading tick of 0.1 penny).  The warrant’s 
Black-Scholes value dropped to zero after July 23, 2007 and stayed at zero for the warrant’s 
remaining 9-month lifetime. Notably, during this zero-fundamental period, the warrant mostly 
traded for several Yuan!  The price dropped to below one Yuan only in the last few trading days.  
There are two caveats for using the Black-Scholes model to measure the warrant’s 
fundamental value.  First, the Black-Scholes model builds on an arbitrage mechanism linking the 
price of a warrant to that of its underlying stock.  Investors cannot arbitrage any price 
discrepancy between the two in China because they cannot short sell either the stock or the 
warrant.  Second, the Black-Scholes model relies on a set of assumptions about the underlying 
stock price dynamics, such as a geometric Brownian motion process with constant volatility, 
which may not fit the stock price dynamics in China.  These considerations caution us not to 
over-interpret the exact Black-Scholes value.  Nevertheless, when the Black-Scholes value of a 
warrant drops to below 0.05 penny, it indicates that there is only a tiny probability, if any, that 
the warrant could be in the money at expiration and that the warrant has virtually no value. 
Moreover, the valuation error of the Black-Scholes model is likely small in absolute terms 
(Hauser and Lauterbach (1997)). 
We also construct a model-free upper bound to demonstrate overvaluation of the warrant, 
based on the following consideration.   The WuLiang stock price, like other common stocks 
traded in China, is only allowed to drop by no more than 10% each day. This implies that the 
stock price on an earlier day puts a floor on the stock price before the warrant’s expiration day. 
Consequently, the warrant payoff is capped by the implied floor on the stock price. To illustrate 
this cap, consider March 7, 2008, 13 trading days before the warrant’s last trading day and 18 
days before its expiration day. WuLiang stock closed at 50.61 Yuan on this day.  This price 
implies that the lowest level WuLiang stock price could reach before the warrant expiration is 
                                                 
7 We have implemented a binomial model to adjust for the extended five-day exercise period in computing the 
Black-Scholes value. 
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50.61×(1-10%)
18=7.596 Yuan, assuming that the stock would hit its daily price drop limit in 18 
consecutive days. Then, the maximum payoff from the put warrant could only be 0.294, which is 
the difference between the warrant’s strike price 7.89 Yuan and the lowest possible stock price 
before expiration of 7.596 Yuan.  The closing price of the warrant on this day stood at 0.543 
Yuan, which was higher than the warrant’s highest possible payoff.
8  
Figure 1 also plots the fundamental upper bound based on WuLiang stock’s closing price on 
each day.  This upper bound dropped to zero and stayed there right after March 7, 2008.  Thus, 
the price of the WuLiang put warrant was above its maximum payoff implied by the underlying 
stock price and the daily price drop limit for 14 consecutive trading days before the warrant 
expiration!  
Also note that the put warrant’s strike price provides a more relaxed upper bound on the 
warrant payoff. A put warrant can generate a payoff equal to its strike price only when the 
underlying stock price drops to zero before the warrant’s expiration day. Figure 1 shows that the 
price of the WuLiang put warrant was even above its strike price on June 13 and 14, 2007.  On 
June 13, the warrant had reached an intraday high of 8.51 Yuan and closed at 8.00 Yuan.  On 
June 14, 2007, it had reached an intraday high of 9.33 Yuan and closed at 8.15 Yuan.  These 
prices were all substantially higher than the warrant’s strike price of 7.89 Yuan.   
To sum up, there is clear evidence that there was a price bubble in the WuLiang put warrant. 
Its price had exceeded any reasonable estimates of its fundamental value—it had exceeded the 
Black-Scholes value by large margins; it had also gone above the fundamental upper bound 
                                                 
8 All 16 put warrants in our sample are stock settled. As a result, it is theoretically possible that warrant holders may 
expect to gain from hedging a big jump in the stock price towards zero. However, the magnitude of the implied gain 
does not appear plausible. For example, the close prices of the WuLiang warrant and WuLiang stock two weeks 
before the warrant’s last trading day (which is fifteen business days before the warrant expiration date) are 0.440 and 
34.85 Yuan, respectively. Each warrant can be exercised for 1.402 underlying shares. Suppose that the WuLiang 
stock price might jump down to zero before the warrant expiration, and we denote the (risk-neutral) probability as p. 
Upon the occurrence of such an extreme event, the warrant generates the maximum payoff of 5.627 (its strike price 
from Table 1) per share. For simplicity, we ignore the fifteen-day time value of money below which does not affect 
the result. From 0.440/1.402=p×5.627, p=0.0558. This implies the (risk neutral) expected return of the WuLiang 
stock conditioning on no jump (denoted as r) satisfies p(-1)+(1-p)r=0, hence r=5.91% in the fifteen-day period, 
which is equivalent to 5.91%×252/15=99% per year! However, China’s risk-free rate (measured by the bank deposit 
rate) has stayed below 5% per year in the same sample period (data source: IMF International Financial Statistics). 
Calculations using other days-to-maturity show similarly implausible (risk-neutral) expected return for this hedging 
argument to support the observed warrant price. Furthermore, the put warrants are stock settled by selling the 
underlying stocks back to the issuing companies. In case the underlying company bankrupts, the warrant holders’ 
right is unclear in China. Therefore, the warrants do not provide a reliable hedge against such jump to ruin. 
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implied by the current stock price and the daily stock price drop limit; and it had even exceeded 
the warrant’s strike price.     
 
Figure 2. Volume and volatility of WuLiang put warrant 
This figure shows WuLiang put warrant’s daily turnover, daily trading volume (in billion Yuan), and 5-
minute return volatility (annualized) in each trading day. 



















































































Like the Internet bubble analyzed by Lamont and Thaler (2003) and Ofek and Richardson 
(2003) and many other historical bubble episodes, the price bubble in the WuLiang put warrant 
came with a trading frenzy and extraordinary volatility.  Figure 2 plots its daily turnover rate and 
daily volume (measured in billions of Yuan). The daily turnover rate was impressive. It averaged 
140% and shot up to as high as 1,841% on the last trading day, i.e., the WuLiang put warrant 
changed hands for more than 18 times on that day. The warrant had an average daily volume of 
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1.06 billion Yuan (roughly 150 million US dollars because the exchange rate was about 7 
Yuan/dollar during this period).  The volume was especially high during the second half of the 
warrant’s life after July 23, 2007 when the warrant’s Black-Scholes value dropped to zero.  The 
volume rose to as high as 12 billion Yuan on a single day in July 2007.  In other words, investors 
traded a pile of essentially worthless papers for almost 2 billion US dollars on a single day! If we 
assume a 0.2% trading commission for both buyers and sellers to pay to their brokerage firms, 
this warrant generated a trading commission in the order of 8 million US dollars each day.  
To put the trading frenzy in the WuLiang put warrant in perspectives, it is useful to compare 
its turnover rate with that in a few other markets. Stocks listed on New York Stock Exchange, a 
liquid market by many measures, have a turnover rate of about 100% per year.  The WuLiang 
put warrant’s turnover rate on average is 340 times higher than that of NYSE stocks and on the 
last trading day is 4,600 times higher. Another useful benchmark is Palm stock, one of the iconic 
stocks in the Internet bubble. As documented by Lamont and Thaler (2003), Palm stock in its 
glorious days of early 2000 was traded at a rate of 100% per week. The WuLiang put warrant’s 
turnover rate on average is 7 times of the Palm’s turnover rate and on the last trading day is 90 
times higher than the Palm’s.  The WuLiang put warrant is extremely active even in the Chinese 
standard.  A-share stocks (shares issued to domestic residents) on the Shanghai and Shenzhen 
stock exchanges have an average turnover rate of 500% per year, e.g., Mei, Scheinkman and 
Xiong (2005),  while across the Taiwan strait on the Taiwan Stock Exchange stocks have an 
average turnover rate of 300% per year, e.g. Barber, Lee, Liu and Odean (2008).     
Figure 2 also plots the daily return volatility of the WuLiang put warrant constructed from 
its intraday 5-minute returns.
9  The annualized warrant volatility varied dramatically over time 
between a minimum level of 18% and a maximum level of 1,475%.  The average was 111%.  
The volatility of a typical U.S. stock is about 40%.  Thus, the warrant’s average volatility was 
about three times that of a typical U.S. stock and its maximum volatility was more than 30 times 
                                                 
9 To mitigate the effect of microstructure noise on volatility estimation (see for example Aït-Sahalia, Mykland and 
Zhang (2005)), we feature 5-minute return volatility as opposed to transaction-to-transaction return volatility, though 
the result is similar using alternative measures of volatility. The Chinese warrant market is very liquid using a 
number of traditional measures of liquidity. Therefore, using 5-minute return to measure volatility likely strikes a 
balance between sample size and microstructure noise. 
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higher.  It is also interesting to note that while there was a large return volatility, the price of the 
WuLiang warrant had not crashed down to zero before its last day of trading.  
3.2  Other Warrants 
Table 1 provides a complete list of the 16 publicly traded put warrants, in the order of their 
expiration date.  These warrants have a long maturity, ranging from 9 months to 2 years, and an 
exercise period right before the expiration date.  The exercise period lasts from 1 to 5 business 
days, with the exception of the JiChang put warrant which has an exercise period of 9 months.  
These warrants are adjusted for any stock split and dividend payout during their lifetime.  
The Shanghai Stock Exchange Composite Index, a representative price index for China’s 
stock market, shot up from 1,080 points in June 2005 to an all-time peak of 6,124 points in 
October 2007.  This market run up had caused all of the 16 put warrants to be out of money on 
their respective expiration days. Among them, 14 were 20% out of money (i.e., the underlying 
stock prices were 20% higher than the strike prices) and 13 were 50% out of money.  
Each of the 16 put warrants had experienced a price bubble similar to that exhibited by the 
WuLiang put warrant. Table 2 shows that each warrant had a period in which it had zero 
fundamental value (defined as the Black-Scholes value below 0.0005 Yuan), and yet 
substantially higher prices with an average of 1.00 Yuan, which was only slightly lower than the 
average warrant price in the full sample. The length of the zero-fundamental period varied across 
warrants from a minimum of 6 days to a maximum of 165 days, with an average of 54 days. 
Table 2 also shows that, much like the WuLiang experience, each warrant had been actively 
traded at an average daily turnover rate of 291% and an average daily volume of 1.26 billion 
Yuan during the zero-fundamental period.  The ZhaoHang put warrant even had a one-day 
volume of 45.68 billion Yuan. The return volatility of these put warrants averaged at 248% per 
annum and went to as high as 2297% per annum on a single day for the WuGang put warrant.  
Table 3 shows that 13 of the 16 warrants violated the fundamental upper bound implied by 
the daily stock price drop limit, and 2 put warrants’ prices exceeded their respective strikes.  
Could the abnormally high prices and extremely active trading of these put warrants be 
caused by investors’ demand for hedging the underlying stocks?  Interestingly, Table 2 shows 
that on average, these put warrants had a small and insignificant return correlation of -0.031 (p-
value 60.3%) with their underlying stocks during their respective zero-fundamental periods. At 
the individual level, only one of the 16 put warrants, GangFan, had a significantly negative 
  14  
return correlation with the underlying stock.  The lack of return correlation between these 
warrants and their underlying stocks refutes the argument that investors trade these warrants to 
hedge the underlying stocks.    
Investors may treat warrants like lottery tickets.  Gamblers prefer a lottery ticket despite its 
unfavorable odds because it provides a positively skewed payoff, i.e., the payoff can either take a 
large positive value with a small probability or a small negative value with a large probability.  
Several recent economic theories suggest that investors might have a similar risk preference 
toward financial investment and cause assets with positive skewness to be overvalued.
10 Are 
warrants lottery tickets?  Table 2 shows that for the daily returns, 13 of the 16 warrants have 
negative return skewness with an average of -1.362 and a significant t-statistic of 2.29.
11 In 
unreported results, skewness of the 5-minute intraday warrant returns also tends to be negative. 
The lack of evidence of positive skewness in both intraday and daily warrant returns refutes 
gambling behavior as a reasonable explanation of the warrants bubble.  
3.3  Maturity Effects  
Each warrant has a predetermined last trading date.  How does the approaching of the last 
trading date affect the warrants market dynamics?  We analyze this question by focusing on the 
data sample of the 16 put warrants in their zero-fundamental periods.  As we discussed before, in 
each warrant’s zero-fundamental period, it has an economically negligible fundamental value, 
and thus its price approximates the price bubble. We call this data sample the bubble sample, 
which will be the primary focus of our analysis from now on. 
Figure 3 plots the warrants’ price bubble and return volatility, averaged across the 16 
warrants in the bubble sample, with respect to the number of trading days remaining.  An 
interesting pattern is that while there is a clear downward trend in the price bubble as the last 
trading day approaches, the price drop is gradual in the sense that there is not any dramatic crash 
down to zero before the last day of trading.  The price moves from an average of around 1.4 
                                                 
10 Barberis and Huang (2008) develop such a theory based on a behavioral bias that when evaluating risk, people 
tend to overweigh the tails of the distribution. Brunnermeier, Gollier and Parker (2007) also propose a theory based 
on the idea that agents derive utility not only from consumption at that time, but also from anticipation of future 
consumption. Both theories predict overvaluation of assets with positive return skewness relative to the prediction of 
standard expected utility models.  
11  We also examined the return skewness after excluding the last trading, during which warrant prices usually 
experience dramatic drops to near-zero levels. While the skewness increases after excluding the last trading day, 
there is still no evidence for positive skewness. 
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Yuan when there are 50 trading days remaining down to 0.7 Yuan when there are 6 trading days 
remaining.  The price drop speeds up during the last few trading days, with the price eventually 
ending in pennies at the end of the last trading day. The price volatility gradually increases from 
100% per annum when there are still 50 trading days remaining to over 200% when there are 6 
trading days remaining, and shot further up in the last few days to 1,400% at the end.  
 
Figure 3. Dynamics for zero-fundamental warrants 
This figure shows the average warrant price, the average daily warrant turnover, the average 5-minute 
warrant return volatility (annualized), and the average daily warrant trading volume (in million Yuan) 
against the number of trading days remaining for the 16 put warrants in their respective zero-fundamental 
periods. The averaging is across all warrants with a given number of trading days remaining. 


















































































































Figure 3 also plots the warrants’ daily turnover rate and Yuan volume, averaged across the 
16 warrants in the bubble sample, with respect to the number of trading days remaining. The 
daily turnover rate gradually increases from about 100% when there are still 50 trading days 
remaining to about 400% when there are only 6 trading days remaining and eventually shoots up 
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to over 1,000% on the last trading day.  The average daily Yuan volume displays a different 
pattern. It fluctuates around 3 billion Yuan when there are 40 to 60 trading days remaining, drops 
to around 1 billion Yuan when there are 10 to 40 trading days remaining, and then shoots up to 
over 3 billion Yuan when there are only 7 trading days remaining.  Despite the dramatic increase 
in the daily turnover rate during the last few trading days, the Yuan volume drops to 800 million 
Yuan on the last trading day, because of the large price drop at the end.   
 
Figure 4. Last-day price dynamics of WanHua put warrant 
This figure shows the intra-day transaction price history of the WanHua put warrant on its last trading day 
(April 19, 2007). 
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The price dynamics on the last trading day provide probably an even sharper way of 
examining maturity effects.  Figure 4 plots the price movement of WanHua put warrant during 
its last trading day on April 19, 2007.  This warrant was traded on the Shanghai Stock Exchange 
with regular trading hours from 9:30AM to 11:30AM in the morning and 1PM to 3PM in the 
afternoon.  Figure 4 displays several interesting features. First, the price of WanHua put warrant 
did not have any sudden burst during the last trading day.  It started at 34.2 pennies at the 
opening and gradually moved down to 8.7 pennies at the closing.  Second, while there was a 
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clear downward trend in the price, there were also several large price runups during the day. One 
evident run occurred shortly after the opening from 35 pennies to 44 pennies.  The last half hour 
of trading was even more dramatic. The price quickly rose from 7 pennies to near 15 pennies, 
and then fell back to 7 pennies, but only to run up again to 14 pennies with only 12 minutes away 
from the closing. Finally, the closing price was substantially above zero even though the put 
warrant was deep out of the money and had no chance of getting back in the money during its 
exercise period.  
As shown in Table 3, 13 of the 16 put warrants in our sample on their last trading days had 
no chance of getting back in the money during their exercise periods.  Nevertheless, as shown in 
Table 4, each had an extremely active final trading day, just like the WanHua put warrant, with a 
substantially inflated price at the opening and a gradual downward price trend during the day.   
In summary, there are evident maturity effects in the warrants bubble. As the maturity 
approaches, the price bubble gradually declines to zero, accompanied by an increasing trend in 
return volatility and warrant turnover.  While people usually think that a bubble will end with a 
crash, this warrants bubble only deflates gradually.   
4  The Bubble Mechanism 
Given the restrictive legal ban on short selling, it is easy to understand the failure of 
arbitrage. However, why would anyone be willing to pay inflated prices for these worthless 
warrants in the first place? In this section, we examine the underlying mechanism that leads to 
the warrants bubble.   
4.1  Rational Bubbles 
Economists have made many attempts to explain price bubbles in settings with only rational 
agents.  There are two classes of rational bubble theories, one with symmetric information and 
the other with asymmetric information. Blanchard and Watson (1983) provide an example of 
rational bubbles under symmetric information in a discrete-time model with infinite periods. In 
each period, a bubble component in asset prices on average grows at the same rate as the 
discount rate. This type of rational bubble cannot arise for warrants with finite maturities because 
rational investors’ backward induction rules it out in the earlier periods. 
Rational finite bubbles might appear when agents possess asymmetric information about 
asset fundamentals. Asymmetric information could make the presence of a bubble not commonly 
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known, i.e., it is possible that everyone knows a bubble exists, but everyone may not know 
everyone else knows a bubble exists. Allen, Morris and Postlewaite (1993) show that the lack of 
common knowledge makes it possible for a finite rational bubble to appear under certain 
conditions. The warrants’ final payoffs are determined by the underlying stock prices.  Since the 
underlying stocks are traded simultaneously with the warrants on the same exchanges with the 
prices publicly observable, it is difficult to justify an assumption that investors possess 
asymmetric information about warrant fundamentals. Thus, it is unlikely that the warrants bubble 
is caused by the lack of common knowledge among rational investors about the presence of a 
bubble.  
4.2  The Resale Option Theory 
Economic theorists have also developed the resale option theory of bubbles based on the 
interaction between investors with heterogeneous beliefs. When short-sales of assets are 
constrained and investors hold heterogeneous beliefs about an asset’s fundamentals, Miller 
(1977) suggests that in a static setting, the asset’s price is biased toward the optimists’ belief 
because pessimists cannot short sell and will only sit on the sideline. Harrison and Kreps (1978) 
show that in a dynamic setting, an optimist is willing to pay more than his already optimistic 
belief of asset fundamentals, anticipating the possibility to resell the asset in the future to even 
more optimistic investors. This resale option can drive price higher than the most optimistic 
belief about asset fundamentals by any investor and thus forms a bubble.  
The institutional setting of China’s warrants market satisfies the two necessary ingredients 
of the resale option theory—short-sales constraints and heterogeneous investors.  First, it is 
illegal for investors to short warrants. While the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) had set up a 
creation program to allow a group of designated brokerage firms to issue warrants on the SHSE, 
as we discussed in Section 2, the scope of this creation program was limited. Indeed, the creation 
force was too feeble to cool off the warrants bubble.  
Second, there exists a mix of heterogeneous investors. Despite the fact that the warrant 
fundamentals can be readily derived from the publicly observable underlying stock prices, the 
derivation requires a sufficient degree of understanding about the warrant contracts. Trying to 
anticipate the behavior of other investors and their effect on the warrant prices requires further 
sophistication. As warrants are a new type of security to the Chinese investors, some of them 
may not fully understand the nature of warrants. We have two pieces of evidence confirming the 
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existence of less than fully rational investors.  First, Table 4 shows that at the last trading minute 
of each of the 13 warrants, there were still a large number of unfilled orders trying to buy the 
worthless warrant at positive prices. The bids of these orders ranged from 0.1 penny to as high as 
10.7 pennies. These unfilled buy orders had an average value of 1.1 million Yuan. Second, some 
warrant holders had chosen to exercise their out-of-money warrants at losses.  Table 4 shows that 
among the 13 put warrants, 9 had warrant exercises by investors at losses, with a total loss of 326 
thousand Yuan per warrant on average, although the irrationally exercised warrants were only 
0.38% of the outstanding shares of these warrants.  
On the other hand, there also exist sophisticated investors to whom the existence of less than 
fully rational investors provides a profit opportunity. Indeed, a report issued by the Shanghai 
Stock Exchange shows that half of the exchange's warrant trading volume involved the top 1% 
most active accounts (measured by trading volume) and that these accounts (likely sophisticated 
professionals) had managed to make a profit trading these overvalued warrants.
12  
Unable to short sell, it is natural for a smart investor to speculate on selling an overvalued 
warrant at an even higher price to another buyer in the future.  Without knowing his own 
limitation in warrant trading (or in other words, by being overconfident), a less sophisticated 
investor could also have a similar speculative motive, i.e., he buys a warrant aiming to resell it at 
a higher price later. In such an environment, warrant prices are determined by investors’ 
speculative motives instead of the underlying stock prices. Even when a warrant is deep out of 
the money, investors still trade it as long as its price fluctuates, which may be viewed as profit 
opportunities by these investors. In fact, the trading-friendly environment of the warrants market, 
which we discussed in Section 2, further fuels the investors’ speculative frenzy.  
Scheinkman and Xiong (2003) further develop the resale option theory by presenting a 
continuous-time model, in which overconfident investors trade an asset with each other under 
short-sales constraints.  Their model provides a sharp prediction that the magnitude of the price 
bubble is positively correlated with trading frequency. Overconfidence causes investors to 
interpret information differently and form heterogeneous beliefs about future price movement. 
The more the beliefs of these overconfident investors diverge from each other, the more 
                                                 
12 We have no access to the account level trading data to analyze the heterogeneity across accounts. 
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intensively they trade with each other, and, at the same time, the more they are willing to pay for 
the option to resell the asset to other investors.   
Does this positive correlation appear in the Chinese warrants bubble? We pool together the 
daily closing prices of the 16 put warrants according to their maturities (number of trading days 
remaining). We focus our attention on the bubble sample, i.e., each warrant in its zero-
fundamental period (its Black-Scholes value is less than 0.05 penny, half of the minimum trading 
tick) so that the warrant price is approximately the bubble size. Table 5 provides various panel 
regressions of the warrant prices. Since there is a strong maturity effect in prices, we include a 
maturity fixed effect in these regressions. In regression (1) of Table 5, we regress warrant price 
on daily turnover rate,  
PRICEit = b0 + b1*TURNOVERit + MATURITY FIXED EFFECT + eit.     (1) 
PRICEit is the closing price of warrant i on day t, which is indexed by the number of trading days 
remaining, and e is a generic term capturing sampling noise. The coefficient of interest is b1 in 
front of the daily turnover measure TURNOVERit.  This coefficient is positive and significant 
with a t-statistic of 8.97, confirming a positive correlation between the price bubble and turnover.  
Another implication of this theory is that a bubble is positively correlated with its volatility. 
When the prices are more volatile, investors’ beliefs about the warrants’ future prices fluctuate 
more, and the resale option is more valuable. Note that this prediction is opposite to the standard 
asset pricing theories, which predict a negative correlation between asset price and volatility 
because of the tradeoff between risk and expected returns. In regression (2) of Table 5, we 
regress warrant price on warrant return volatility,  
PRICEit = c0 + c1*VOLit + MATURITY FIXED EFFECT + eit.      (2) 
VOLit is the return volatility of warrant i on day t constructed from 5-minute intraday returns. 
The coefficient of interest is c1 in front of the volatility. The coefficient is again positive and 
significant with a t-statistic of 5.33.   
Hong, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) develop a model to show that asset float (number of 
tradable shares) has a large effect on the size of bubble.  When investors have a limited risk-
bearing capacity, a larger float implies that it takes a greater difference between the optimists’ 
and pessimists’ beliefs for optimists to drive out pessimists.  This implies that it takes a greater 
belief divergence in the future for an existing asset holder to resell profitably, which in turn 
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means that the resale option is less valuable today.  In regression (3) of Table 5, we examine the 
relationship between asset float and the warrants bubble, 
PRICEit = d0 + d1*FLOATit + MATURITY FIXED EFFECT + eit.      (3) 
FLOATit is the total number of warrants outstanding for warrant i on day t. The coefficient of 
interest is d1 in front of the float. The coefficient is negative and highly significant with a t-
statistic of 12.43, confirming the prediction that price bubble is negatively related to asset float.  
We also combine turnover, volatility and float in a single regression—regression (4) of 
Table 5. Each variable has a similar effect on the warrants bubble as in the individual 
regressions.   
Note that the number of tradable shares of the warrants traded on the SHSE changes over 
time because of the exchange’s share creation program. Panel A of Table 6 provides a summary 
of the number of shares issued by the designated brokerage firms for the 10 SHSE-traded 
warrants. Because of the tight control by the SHSE, the shares issued by the brokerage firms in 
the secondary market for most warrants are small relative to the initial shares, although two 
warrants (WanHua and ZhaoHang) had more shares issued by the brokerage firms at some points 
in time. To control for the effect of the time-varying float in our analysis of the warrant price, we 
decompose the total float into the initial float and the net new issuance and repeat regressions (3) 
and (4) using the decomposed float variables. As reported in Panel B of Table 6, the warrant 
price is negatively correlated with the initial float but positively correlated with the net new 
issuance, and both coefficients are statistically significant. The positive correlation between the 
warrant price and the net new issuance shows that the designated brokerage firms tend to issue 
more shares when warrant prices are high.
13  The negative effect of the initial float on the 
warrant price remains the same as that in Table 5.  
Overall, Tables 5 and 6 provide a set of regression results supporting various implications of 
the resale option theory of bubbles. The positive correlation between the warrant price and 
trading volume corroborates a similar observation about many historical bubbles, such as the 
tulip mania in seventeenth century Holland, the stock market bubble before the great crash of the 
late 1920s in the U.S., and more recently the Internet bubble in the late 1990s, e.g., Cochrane 
                                                 
13 By examining the time series of each individual brokerage firm’s issuance, we find no evidence of short squeeze. 
Instead, the issuance generally increases with the price bubble, consistent with the regression result in Panel B of 
Table 6. 
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(2003) and Hong and Stein (2007).  The negative correlation between the warrant price and asset 
float is also consistent with the finding of Ofek and Richardson (2003) that the large increase of 
float in the early 2000 after the lockup expiration of many Internet firms is an important driving 
factor for the burst of the Internet bubble.  
4.3  Understanding the Maturity Effects 
The resale option theory has a direct implication for the effect of asset maturity on price 
bubble.  As the maturity approaches, anticipating that there is less time for reselling his shares in 
the future, a buyer values the resale option less, thus leading to a smaller price bubble. The 
gradual decline in warrant prices before and during the last trading day supports this theory 
prediction. The observation of such a clear maturity effect also indicates the presence of 
sophisticated investors and that the basic backward induction mechanism is still operating even 
in the presence of (potentially confused) inexperienced investors.
  
 
Figure 5. Average warrant price drop  
This figure shows the daily percentage drop of the average warrant price, along with its scaled versions 
(scaled by the average daily warrant turnover and the average 5-minute warrant return volatility 
(annualized), respectively), against the number of trading days remaining for the 16 put warrants in their 
respective zero-fundamental periods. The averaging is across all warrants with a given number of trading 
days remaining. 
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Figure 3 further shows that the warrant price drop accelerates during the last several trading 
days. For a deep out-of-the-money warrant approaching maturity, its return (negative on average) 
largely represents the loss of speculative value. Figure 5 plots the daily percentage drop in 
warrant price averaged across all warrants with a given number of trading days remaining. It 
shows that, while the price drop is relatively stable in the earlier period, there is a dramatic rise 
during the last 8 trading days, indicating a higher resale option value associated with each of the 
days near expiration. This is consistent with Figure 3 which shows that the return volatility and 
share turnover shoot up during the last several trading days, especially on the last day. 
Interestingly, once the maturity effect in warrant price drop is scaled by the corresponding daily 
turnover rate or warrant return volatility, it becomes rather stable across maturity. This confirms 
the resale option theory that the higher resale option value associated with the last several days is 
related to the intensified trading at the end. 
As pointed out by Benartzi, Michaely, Thaler and Weld (2007), while the nominal price 
level does not contain any specific economic meaning, it could nevertheless affect investors’ 
demand for financial assets because of social norms. As the maturity approaches, the warrant 
price gradually drops from the range of several Yuan to pennies, especially in the last few days. 
This low price level can be perceived by some investors as being cheap and therefore attracts 
more speculative trading. While we do not have account-level trading data to verify this 
hypothesis, the dramatic increase of share turnover in the last few days suggests intensified 
speculation. This in turn makes the resale option associated with each of the last several trading 
days more valuable.  
4.4  Positive Feedback 
A large volume of behavioral finance studies suggests that various behavioral biases can 
lead inexperienced individual investors to feedback positively to past returns.
14 Does this 
feedback effect exist in the warrants market? Examining the feedback effect can help us 
 
14 Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) show that representativeness bias, a tendency to view events as typical or 
representative of some specific class, can lead a representative investor to extrapolate past price changes into 
expectations of future price changes. Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) and Gervais and Odean (2001) 
show that self-attribution bias, a tendency to attribute success to one’s own ability but failure to external reasons, 
can also cause investors to feedback to past price increases. Hong and Stein (1999) provide a model to show that 
gradual diffusion of information among heterogeneous investors can lead to price momentum. Grinblatt and Han 
(2005) show that the interaction between smart investors and individual investors with disposition effect, a 
propensity to sell shares of a stock that has risen in value rather than one that has fallen (e.g., Odean (1998)), can 
result in a feedback effect.   
understand the time-series dynamics of the warrants bubble. We study the joint dynamics of the 
warrants’ return and turnover change in the bubble sample by running the following regressions: 
RETit (or ΔTURNOVERit) = h0 + h1* RETit-1 + h2* RET
+
it-1+ h3*ΔTURNOVERit-1          (5) 
   + WARRANT FIXED EFFECT + MATURITY FIXED EFFECT + eit  
where RET
+ = max(0,RET). RETit, and ΔTURNOVERit refer to the one-period return and one-
period proportional change in turnover of warrant i in period t. We also include RET
+, the 
truncated positive part of the lagged warrant return in our analysis to examine asymmetry in the 
feedback effects.
15 We examine the dynamics in different time intervals, including each period 
being 5-minute, 10-minute, 30-minute, 1-hour, 2-hour and 1-day intervals. 
Table 7 reports the empirical results. Panel A shows the pooled regression results of warrant 
return on lagged warrant return and turnover change. Several interesting patterns emerge from 
the panel.  First, the coefficient of lagged warrant return is significantly positive in regressions 
with 5-minute and 10-minute intervals, but not with longer intervals such as 30-minute, 1-hour, 
2-hour and 1-day intervals. This result indicates a positive feedback effect in warrant returns, 
albeit only in frequencies much faster than what are typically observed in other markets. For 
example, numerous empirical studies following Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) find price 
momentum in individual stocks across the world in time intervals of around 6 months. The 
difference in the feedback frequency of these markets is consistent with the dramatic difference 
in their turnover rates—the average daily turnover of the Chinese warrants is 291% (e.g., Table 
2), while the average yearly turnover of the U.S. stocks is less than 100%. The fast feedback 
frequency of 10 minutes in the warrants market confirms that the market operates at a much 
higher speed.
  
There is little evidence of asymmetric feedback of warrant returns to past warrant returns, 
because the coefficient of the truncated positive part of lagged warrant return is insignificant 
across all regression intervals. Furthermore, there is little evidence of intra-day feedback effects 
in warrant returns to past turnover changes. 
Panel B shows the pooled regression results of turnover change. Besides a significant mean-
reverting effect in turnover, we also observe several other effects from this panel. First, 
                                                 
15 We have also examined specifications without RET
+. Dropping RET
+ does not affect the regression coefficients of 
other variables. We have also included the lagged change in volatility and found it does not change the effects of the 
return or the change in turnover. 
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consistent with the feedback effect in warrant returns, there is a statistically significant positive 
feedback effect in turnover changes to past warrant returns in time intervals up to 1 hour. 
Second, the response of turnover changes to past warrant returns is asymmetric. The coefficient 
of the truncated positive part of lagged warrant return is significantly negative in regressions 
with time intervals up to 1 hour, suggesting that the drop in turnover in response to a negative 
warrant return is more pronounced than the increase in turnover in response to a positive warrant 
return.   
The presence of positive responses of both warrant returns and turnover changes to past 
warrant returns again highlights the importance of incorporating investor heterogeneity in 
understanding the warrants bubble, consistent with the key insight of our earlier analysis.  
4.5  Riding the Bubble  
Are there profit opportunities in the warrants market for smart investors to exploit? Given 
the presence of the positive feedback effect in the warrant returns, it is natural to evaluate 
momentum trading strategies. A common momentum strategy involves buying past winners and 
simultaneously shorting past losers. We pool together the 16 put warrants in their zero-
fundamental periods based on the number of trading days remaining. We construct hypothetical 
winner and loser portfolios based on the warrant returns in a formation period and then compute 
the portfolio returns in a holding period.  Table 8 reports the portfolio returns under different 
portfolio specifications. We let the length of the portfolio formation and holding periods to be 
equal and vary it from 5 minutes to 1 day. In panel A, the winner portfolio consists of the top 
half of warrants based on their returns in the formation period, while the loser portfolio consists 
of the bottom half; in panel B, the winner portfolio consists of the top quartile, while the loser 
portfolio consists of the bottom quartile; in panel C, the winner portfolio includes warrants with 
positive returns in the formation period, while the loser portfolio includes those with negative 
returns.  
Since investors are not allowed to short warrants, we look at the returns of the winner and 
loser portfolios separately.  Interestingly, across all specifications, the returns of the winner 
portfolios are mostly negative and statistically insignificant. In other words, it is not profitable 
for additional momentum traders to ride the warrants bubble. Given the presence of the positive 
return feedback effect in 5-minute and 10-minute intervals, why is riding the past winners not 
profitable at these frequencies? The answer lies in the maturity effect in warrant prices. As we 
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discussed in Section 3.3, there is a pronounced downward trend in prices, which largely offsets 
the short-run positive momentum.  Table 8 also shows that the returns of the loser portfolios are 
negative across all specifications and most of them are statistically significant. If investors were 
able to short the loser portfolios, the momentum strategies would be profitable.   
The absence of positive momentum profit suggests that smart investors likely have been 
actively riding the warrants bubble and, by doing so, have eliminated additional opportunities for 
such momentum trades. This result is consistent with the evidence presented by Brunnermeier 
and Nagel (2004) that during the recent Internet bubble, many hedge funds (the likely smart 
investors) had been active in riding the bubble, instead of attacking it.
16 
5  Comparing to Bubbles in Experimental Markets 
Because of the difficulty in measuring asset fundamentals in field data, most empirical 
analysis of asset bubbles are carried out in experimental studies. The Chinese warrants bubble 
confirms some important findings of the experimental studies, and also provides some additional 
insights for future experimental studies.  
The Chinese warrants bubble confirms a key finding of the experimental literature that 
bubbles could arise even when asset payoffs are publicly observable. This phenomenon was first 
discovered by the classic study of Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) and since then has been 
replicated in many other studies, e.g., Porter and Smith (1995), Lei, Noussair, and Plott (2001),  
Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore (2005), Ackert, et al (2006), Haruvy and Noussair (2006), 
Hirota and Sunder (2007), Haruvy, Lahav, and Noussair (2007), and Hussam, Porter and Smith 
(2008), under a variety of treatments. As is typical in these studies, markets are created for 
traders to trade dividend-paying assets with a lifetime of a finite number of periods. The only 
source of intrinsic value of the assets is the dividends, whose distributions are publicly 
announced to all traders. A common finding in these experimental studies is that the assets are 
often traded in high volumes at prices substantially above the fundamental value. The warrants in 
our sample also have finite maturities with final payoffs determined by the underlying stock 
prices, which are publicly observable to all market participants. Thus, the warrants bubble 
confirms the existence of bubbles even when asset fundamentals are publicly observable. Our 
                                                 
16 Some commentators had even suggested the existence of large manipulators using pump-and-dump strategies 
(e.g., Delong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1990)) to take advantage of the large number of naïve investors in 
the warrants market. Because of the lack of account level data, we cannot directly examine this hypothesis. 
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analysis in the previous section further shows that there is a positive correlation between the 
price bubble and trading volume in the warrants bubble. 
Smith, Suchanek and Williams (1988) interpret the bubble discovered in their experimental 
study as arising through agents’ uncertainty about the behavior of others. More precisely, the 
bubble occurs because traders doubt about the rationality of other traders and therefore speculate 
that future prices may not track the fundamental value and instead would provide opportunities 
for trading gains. Interestingly, as we discussed before, the existence of a mix of inexperienced 
and sophisticated investors in the Chinese warrants market is crucial for understanding the 
warrants bubble. Thus, our study also confirms the importance of analyzing agent heterogeneity 
in the experimental studies.  
The experimental studies have identified short-sales constraints as a crucial factor for the 
appearance of asset bubbles. Ackert, et al (2006) and Haruvy and Noussair (2006) find that 
relaxing short-sales constraints tends to lower prices. As we discussed before, the stringent short-
sales constraints in the Chinese warrants market is also a key factor for understanding the 
warrants bubble. Interestingly, despite the effort by the Shanghai Stock Exchange to create a 
shorting mechanism and the substantial amount of shorting by the designated brokerage firms, 
the warrants prices were still above the fundamental value. This failure reflects a practical 
difficulty in relaxing short-sales constraints. Because the warrants in our sample are all settled by 
delivery, the SHSE cannot allow the brokerage firms to issue warrants substantially more than 
the number of the floating shares of the underlying stocks. Otherwise, it is impossible for all the 
warrant holders to exercise their warrants if they end up in the money.   
The experimental studies, e.g., Dufwenberg, Lindqvist, and Moore (2005), Haruvy, Lahav, 
and Noussair (2007), and Hussam, Porter and Smith (2008), also find that as traders gain more 
trading experience, the divergence in their price expectations is attenuated, and markets become 
thinner. Our data sample of the warrants bubble spans three years and thus provides a unique 
opportunity to examine the effects of investor experience on price bubbles.  Had the warrants 
market become less speculative as investors observed the previous warrants expiring out of 
money? To examine this investor-learning hypothesis, we split the 16 put warrants in our sample 
into two halves (each with 8 warrants) based on their expiration dates, and report separate 
statistics for the two subsamples in Tables 2, 3, and 4.  Table 2 shows that the last 8 warrants on 
average had a longer zero-fundamental period than the first 8. During the zero-fundamental 
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periods, the last 8 warrants had an average price level of 1.47 Yuan, while the first 8 only had an 
average of 0.53 Yuan. The difference is significant with a p-value of 0.03. Table 3 also shows 
that the last 8 warrants had a greater number of trading days in violation of the fundamental 
upper bound than the first 8. The differences between these two subsamples in other dimensions, 
such as turnover, volatility, the magnitude of violating the fundamental upper bound, the last 
trading day dynamics, and irrational warrant exercises, are insignificant. Taken together, we do 
not see any evidence of investor learning. If anything, the last 8 warrants had larger price bubbles 
over longer periods relative to the first 8. 
What explains the lack of investor learning in the Chinese warrants market? It turns out that 
there was a steady flow of new investors attracted into the Chinese financial markets by the stock 
market boom. According to a recent report by the CSRC (2008), the total number of individual 
brokerage accounts in China had increased from 80 million to 140 million from 2005 to 2007. It 
is conceivable that many of these new investors had been trading warrants. While we do not have 
access to account-level data, a recent study by Pan, Shi and Song (2008) analyzes all the 
accounts involved in trading one warrant issued by the BaoGang Cooperation and find that the 
flow of new investors had a positive impact on the warrant price. The large inflow of 
inexperienced investors is common during the booming periods of many developed and 
emerging financial markets. Since most experimental studies focus on a given set of subjects, 
they tend to miss the important effects of the endogenous inflow of inexperienced investors on 
bubbles. Our study thus prompts incorporation of investor flow in future experimental studies. 
6  Implications for Financial Market Development 
The Chinese warrants bubble occurred during the early stage of China’s development of its 
derivatives markets. This episode offers an important implication for financial market 
development, which could be useful for many other emerging economies. The Chinese 
government introduced warrants with the aspiration that they can provide a tool for the Chinese 
investors to hedge stock price risk in a market environment with many existing restrictions on 
trading stocks, such as prohibition on short-selling and margin buying. To facilitate this 
objective, the Chinese government has enacted several rules (the T+0 rule, no stamp tax and 
registration fee, and wider daily price change limit) to make trading warrants much more 
convenient than trading stocks. This effort failed to achieve its intended effect. Instead, it led to a 
spectacular bubble. This outcome might appear surprising. However, it could be explained by a 
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widely documented psychological bias---illusion of control, i.e., people behave as if their 
personal involvement can influence the outcome of random events (Langer, 1975 and Presson 
and Benassi, 1996). This bias implies that investors are likely to confuse the control they have---
over trading the warrants quickly and cheaply---with the control they lack---over the return the 
warrants might realize.
17 The frenzied trading and spectacular bubble occurred in the Chinese 
warrants market thus caution future governments regarding granting too much trading capacity to 
(possibly inexperienced) investors at an early stage of market development.   
7  Conclusion  
In this paper we examine a speculative bubble that occurred in 2005-08 in China’s warrants 
market. Despite being so deep out of the money that there was no chance of getting back in the 
money before maturity, the put warrants had been turned over on average almost 300% a day at 
substantially inflated prices. Since the publicly observable underlying stock prices make the zero 
warrant fundamentals commonly known to all market participants, this warrants bubble presents 
a unique opportunity to study bubble mechanisms. We find evidences supporting the resale 
option theory of bubbles: in an environment where short-sales are constrained and investors are 
heterogeneous, they overpay for a warrant and hoping to resell it at an even higher price to a 
greater fool. Our study confirms several key findings of the experimental studies of asset 
bubbles, and also provides useful implications for financial market development.   
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Table 1. Summary information of the 16 put warrants 
This table shows, for each put warrant, its ticker, name, exchange (Shenzhen or Shanghai), total shares outstanding of the warrant and the underlying stock at the 
start of warrant trading, trading period, and exercise period. This table also shows the closing price of the underlying stock, along with the warrant strike price and 
exercise ratio (number of underlying stocks per warrant) on the first and the last day of the warrant trading period. The warrants are sorted according to the 
expiration date of their exercise periods. 
 









Initial Information  Trading Period  Exercise Period  End Information 














38002 WanKe  Shenzhen 2140  2673 3.78  3.73  1  12/5/2005 8/28/2006  8/29/2006  9/4/2006  6.79  3.638  1 
580999 WuGang Shanghai  474  2370  2.77  3.13  1  11/23/2005 11/15/2006  11/16/2006  11/22/2006  3.35  2.83  1 
580998 JiChang Shanghai  240  476  6.77  7  1  12/23/2005 12/15/2006  3/23/2006  12/22/2006  7.94  6.9  1 
580994 YuanShui Shanghai  280  684  4.27  5  1  4/19/2006 2/5/2007  2/6/2007  2/12/2007  6.54  4.9  1 
580996 HuChang Shanghai  568  901  11.85 13.6  1  3/7/2006 2/27/2007  3/6/2007  3/6/2007  25.52  13.36  1 
580995 BaoGang Shanghai  715  1843  2.1  2.45 1 3/31/2006  3/23/2007  3/26/2007 3/30/2007  5.7 2.37  1 
580993 WanHua Shanghai  85  328  16.42  13  1  4/27/2006  4/19/2007 4/20/2007  4/26/2007  38.75 9.22 1.41 
38001 GangFan Shenzhen  233  875  3.3  4.85  1  12/5/2005 4/24/2007 5/8/2007  5/8/2007  10.72  3.16  1.535 
580991 HaiEr Shanghai  607  742 4.74  4.39 1 5/22/2006  5/9/2007  5/10/2007  5/16/2007  15.79  4.29 1 
580992 YaGe Shanghai 635  907  6.8 4.25 1 5/22/2006  5/14/2007  5/17/2007  5/21/2007  26.44  4.09 1 
580990 MaoTai Shanghai  432  302 48.39  30.3 0.25 5/30/2006  5/22/2007  5/29/2007 5/29/2007 94.84  30.3 0.25 
38008  JiaFei Shenzhen 120  336 20.3  15.1  1  6/30/2006 6/22/2007  6/25/2007  6/29/2007  45.21  15.1  1 
580997 ZhaoHang Shanghai  2241  4705  6.37  5.65  1  3/2/2006 8/24/2007 8/27/2007  8/31/2007  39.04 5.45  1 
38006 ZhongJi  Shenzhen  424  606 13.98 10  1  5/25/2006  11/16/2007 11/19/2007  11/23/2007  24.11 7.302  1.37 
38003 HuaLing Shenzhen  633  880  3.64 4.9  1  3/2/2006 2/22/2008 2/27/2008  2/29/2008  12.45  4.718  1 
38004 WuLiang  Shenzhen  313  893  7.11 7.96  1  4/3/2006 3/26/2008 3/27/2008  4/2/2008  25.92  5.627  1.402 
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Table 2. Market dynamics of the 16 put warrants during their zero-fundamental period 
This table shows, for each warrant, the sample period of zero fundamental value defined by its Black-Scholes value at the end of each trading day being less than 0.0005 Yuan 
(half of the minimum trading tick). The Black-Scholes value is computed using the previous one year’s daily return volatility. This table reports, for each warrant in its zero-
fundamental period, the time-series average/maximum of its daily closing price, daily turnover, daily trading volume (in million Yuan), and daily 5-minute return volatility 
(annualized). For each warrant in its zero-fundamental period, this table reports the pairwise correlation between the daily warrant return and the daily return of the underlying 
stock, along with the p-value for the null hypothesis that the correlation is zero. This table also reports, for each warrant, the daily return skewness coefficient and the p-value for 
the null hypothesis of zero skewness (the p-value is calculated using the Pearson Type VII curve approximation in D'Agostino and Tietjen (1973) which requires at least 8 daily 
return observations). Cross-sectional averages for all warrants, for the first 8 warrants, and for the last 8 warrants are reported along with the differences between the averages of 
the first 8 and the last 8 warrants and the p-values for testing the null hypothesis of no difference between the first 8 and last 8 warrants. 
 
          Warrant Price  Daily Turnover  Yuan Volume (mil)  Volatility (annualized)  Corr(stock ret, put ret)  Skewness(put ret) 
Ticker  Name  First Obs  Last Obs  # Days  Avg  Max  Avg Max Avg Max  Avg  Max  Corr p-value  Skewness  p-value 
38002  WanKe 8/3/2006 8/28/2006  17 0.055  0.09 178% 547%  176  317  306%  1139% -0.424 9.00%  -1.879  0.001 
580999  WuGang  11/6/2006  11/15/2006 7  0.188  0.281  765%  1695%  756 1,451 763% 2297%  0.045  92.50% 0.931   
580998 JiChang  12/6/2006 12/15/2006  6  0.721  0.96  378%  725%  767  1,334  278%  414%  0.383  45.40%  -0.899   
580994 YuanShui  1/24/2007  2/5/2007  9  0.379  0.562  510%  1471%  711  2,589  397%  1362%  -0.166  66.90%  -0.292  0.613 
580996  HuChang  1/10/2007  2/27/2007 30  0.586  0.924  264%  991% 751 2,162 214% 1309% 0.46 1.10% -2.461  0 
580995 BaoGang  2/13/2007  3/23/2007  24 0.448  0.588  296%  1406%  1,000 2,621  165%  1019% -0.082 70.40% -2.891  0 
580993  WanHua  1/9/2007  4/19/2007 67  1.014  1.39  183%  1438%  299 1,700 133% 1772%  -0.035  77.70%  -2.757  0 
38001 GangFan 3/13/2007  4/24/2007  27  0.843 1.25  237%  1316%  364  881  173%  1438%  -0.435  2.30%  -3.069  0 
580991 HaiEr  12/4/2006  5/9/2007  89 0.614  0.826 96% 1072%  353  1,280  100%  1620% -0.021 84.40%  -4.945  0 
580992  YaGe  2/12/2007  5/14/2007 55  0.544  0.749  145%  972% 433 1,250 122% 1433%  0.006  96.70%  -3.747  0 
580990  MaoTai  4/16/2007  5/22/2007 19 0.41  0.71  289%  815% 523 1,875 316% 2112%  -0.142  56.10%  -1.452  0.006 
38008 JiaFei  4/9/2007 6/22/2007  44 1.97  6.07  363% 1741% 1,285  7,990  300%  1669%  0.003  98.30%  1.703  0 
580997 ZhaoHang 12/18/2006  8/24/2007  165  0.628  3.269  180%  1198%  6,384  45,683  153%  1872%  -0.11  15.80%  4.861  0 
38006 ZhongJi 5/22/2007 11/16/2007  111 3.034 7.12  312% 1662% 3,680 17,053  180%  1150%  -0.052  58.70%  -0.766  0.002 
38003  HuaLing  9/13/2007  2/22/2008 40  1.768  3.87  246%  1306%  1,428  3,907 242% 1384%  -0.013  93.80%  -1.181  0.003 
38004 WuLiang 7/23/2007  3/26/2008  150  2.815 5.218  210%  1841%  1,286  4,974  131%  1475%  0.094  25.10%  -2.954  0 
Average 54  1.001  2.117  291%  1262%  1,262  6,067  248%  1467%  -0.031  60.3%  -1.362  0.037 
Average(first 8 puts)  23  0.529  0.756  351%  1199%  603  1,632  304%  1344%  -0.032    -1.665   
Average(last 8 puts)  84  1.473  3.479  230%  1326%  1,922  10,502  193%  1589%  -0.029    -1.060   
Diff 61  0.944  2.723  -121%  127%  1,319  8,870  -111%  246%  0.002    0.605   
p-value  0.010 0.032 0.010  0.140  0.526  0.099  0.120  0.179  0.286  0.984    0.628     
Table 3. Violations of the fundamental upper bound by the 16 put warrants 
This table shows, for each warrant, the number of days its closing price is higher than the fundamental upper bound 
computed by assuming its underlying stock price drops 10% every day before expiration (maximum daily drop 
allowed in China’s stock market). Also reported is the time-series average/minimum/maximum of the dollar amount 
that the closing price surpasses the upper bound when the bound is violated. This table also shows the number of 
days that a put warrant’s closing price is above its strike price. Cross-sectional averages for all warrants, for the first 
8 warrants, and for the last 8 warrants are reported along with the differences between the averages of the first 8 and 
the last 8 warrants and the p-values for testing the null hypothesis of no difference between the first 8 and last 8 
warrants. 
 
      Magnitude of Violation 
Ticker Name 
# of  Days in 
Violation 
Average Min  Max 
# of Days with 
Price > Strike 
38002  WanKe  1  0.001 0.001 0.001  0 
580999  WuGang  0     0 
580998  JiChang  0     0 
580994  YuanShui  0     0 
580996 HuChang  3  0.319  0.015  0.5  0 
580995  BaoGang 5  0.225 0.006 0.491  0 
580993  WanHua 9  0.527 0.087 0.828  0 
38001 GangFan  2  0.153  0.01  0.295  0 
580991 HaiEr  7  0.266  0.001  0.48  0 
580992  YaGe  11  0.295 0.002 0.491  0 
580990  MaoTai  7  0.123 0.003 0.299  0 
38008 JiaFei  8  2.564  0.107  4.9  0 
580997  ZhaoHang  13  0.264 0.002 0.673  0 
38006 ZhongJi  8  0.216  0.01  0.438  0 
38003 HuaLing  8  0.256  0.01  0.561  3 
38004  WuLiang  16  0.261 0.004 0.447  2 
Average  6  0.421 0.020 0.800  0.3 
Average(first  8  puts)  3  0.245 0.024 0.423  0 
Average(last 8 puts)  10  0.531  0.017  1.036  1 
Diff  7  0.286 -0.006 0.613  1 
p-value  0.001  0.469 0.761 0.412  0.159 
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Table 4. Market dynamics on the last trading day and irrational warrant exercises 
This table reports, for each warrant that is certain to expire out of money on its last trading day (13 such warrants in total, as shown in Table 3), the 
open/close/average/minimum/maximum of its intra-day transaction price and the daily turnover, trading volume (in million Yuan), and 5-minute warrant return 
volatility (annualized). The highest unfilled bid at trading close and the total value of unfilled bid (in thousands Yuan) are reported, along with the fraction of 
warrant exercised and the total exercise loss (in thousand Yuan, assuming the exercise price equals the closing price on the last trading day) for each put warrant. 
Cross-sectional averages for all warrants, for the first 5 warrants (which belong to the first 8 of our full sample), and for the last 8 warrants (which correspond to 
the last 8 in our full sample) are reported along with the differences between the averages of the first 5 and the last 8 warrants and the p-values for testing the null 





Volume  5min volatility  Unfilled bid at trading end  Exercise 






38002  WanKe  0.018 0.001  0.011 0.004 0.019  547%  98  1139%  2:11:57  PM  0.004  3,824  0.08%  50 
580996 HuChang 0.418 0.015  0.209 0.013 0.426  991%  1089  1309%  3:00:14  PM  0.016  134  0.05%  38 
580995 BaoGang 0.249 0.006 0.124 0.005 0.266  1406%  1215  1019%  3:00:08  PM  0.005  1,308  0.47%  111 
580993  WanHua 0.342 0.087  0.187 0.068 0.439  1438%  482  1772%  3:00:15  PM  0.08  1,316  0.32%  114 
38001 GangFan  0.291 0.01 0.147 0.01 0.315 1316%  422  1438%  3:00:32  PM  0.01  152  0.27%  73 
580991  HaiEr  0.1  0.001  0.049 0.001 0.108  1072%  340  1620%  3:00:07  PM  0.001  453  0.83%  581 
580992  YaGe  0.057 0.002  0.024 0.002 0.059  972%  159  1433%  3:00:19  PM  0.002  728  1.18%  1667 
580990  MaoTai  0.04  0.003  0.017 0.002 0.041  801%  103  2112%  3:00:11  PM  0.003  904  0.20%  141 
38008 JiaFei 0.42  0.107  0.601  0.1  0.93  1741%  1250  1639%  3:00:24  PM  0.107  1,232  0  0 
580997 ZhaoHang  0.161 0.002  0.069 0.001 0.174  968%  3036  1872%  3:00:11  PM  0.001  2,027  0.02%  163 
38006 ZhongJi  0.104  0.01 0.076  0.01  0.107 1662%  469  1150%  3:00:32  PM  0.01  581  0  0 
38003 HuaLing 0.11 0.01 0.093  0.01 0.15  1306%  648  1340%  3:00:23  PM  0.01  1,057  0  0 
38004 WuLiang 0.08 0.004 0.054 0.01 0.08  1841%  285  1475%  2:56:56  PM  0.004  608  0  0 
Average  0.184 0.020  0.128 0.018 0.240  1235%  738  1486%    0.019  1,101  0.38%  326 
Average(first 5 puts)  0.264  0.024  0.136  0.020  0.293  1140%  661  1335%    0.023  1,347  0.24%  77 
Average(last 8 puts)  0.134  0.017  0.123  0.017  0.206  1295%  786  1580%    0.017  949  0.28%  319 
Diff  -0.130 -0.006  -0.013 -0.003 -0.087  156%  125  245%    -0.006  -398  0.04%  242 
p-value  0.115 0.761  0.893 0.871 0.566  0.502  0.797  0.180    0.778  0.496  0.856  0.379 
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Table 5. Determinants of the size of the warrants bubble 
This table includes the regression results of daily warrant closing prices on TURNOVER (daily warrant turnover) in 
column (1), on VOL (5min warrant return volatility) in column (2), on FLOAT (the total number of warrants 
outstanding, in billions) in column (3), and on TURNOVER, VOL, and FLOAT together in column (4). The 
regressions use the zero-fundamental sample (defined as Black-Scholes value less than 0.0005, half of the minimum 
trading tick) and include warrant maturity fixed effect. The t-statistics, in the parentheses, are adjusted for 
heteroskedasticity and correlation within a trading day. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
TURNOVER 0.201      0.158 
(t-stat) (8.97)    (5.39) 
VOL   21.17    14.24 
(t-stat)   (5.33)   (2.95) 
FLOAT     -0.302  -0.324 
(t-stat)    (12.61)  (12.28) 
 
Table 6. Share issuances 
Panel A shows, for each warrant on the Shanghai stock exchange, the time-series average and maximum of 
BROKERAGEISSUE (net total warrant issued by brokerage firms) in the zero-fundamental sample period. 
BROKERAGEISSUE on day t = BROKERAGEISSUE on day (t-1) + number of warrants issued on day t – number 
of warrants cancelled on day t. The zero-fundamental sample includes those trading days when a warrant’s Black-
Scholes value at the end of trading day is less than 0.0005 Yuan (half of the minimum trading tick). For comparison, 
Panel A shows FIRMISSUE (which denotes the total amount of warrants issued by the underlying firm from Table 
1). FIRMISSUE remained constant throughout the sample. The sum of FIRMISSUE and BROKERAGEISSUE is 
FLOAT in Table 5. Panel B includes the regression results of daily warrant closing prices on FIRMISSUE and 
BROKERAGEISSUE, with and without controlling for TURNOVER (daily warrant turnover) and VOL (5min 
warrant return volatility). The regressions in Panel B use the zero-fundamental sample and include warrant maturity 
fixed effect. FIRMISSUE and BROKERAGEISSUE are in billions in the regressions. The t-statistics, in the 
parentheses, are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation within a trading day. 
 
Panel A. Net total warrant issuance by brokerage firms during the zero-fundamental sample period 
   BROKERAGEISSUE  (millions)  FIRMISSUE 
Ticker  Name  Avg  Max  (millions, from Table 1) 
580999 WuGang  0  0  474 
580998 JiChang  35  42  240 
580994 YuanShui  80  81  280 
580996 HuChang  18  25  568 
580995 BaoGang  119  119  715 
580993 WanHua  101  104  85 
580991 HaiEr  158  160  607 
580992 YaGe  94  99  635 
580990 MaoTai  331  334  432 
580997 ZhaoHang  1276  4292  2241 
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Panel B. Issuance and the size of the warrants bubble 
 (1)  (2) 
FIRMISSUE -1.306  -1.266 
(t-stat) (24.93)  (23.45) 
BROKERAGEISSUE 0.498  0.421 
(t-stat) (15.78)  (12.59) 
TURNOVER   0.103 
(t-stat)   (3.70) 
VOL   14.46 




Table 7. Feedback dynamics 
This table shows the regression results of RET/ΔTURNOVER on lagged RET, RET+, and ΔTURNOVER. RET is 
warrant return, RET+=max(0,RET), ΔTURNOVER is proportional change in warrant turnover. The regressions use 
the zero-fundamental sample (defined as Black-Scholes value less than 0.0005, half of the minimum tick). The 
regressions include warrant fixed effect and maturity fixed effect. The sampling frequency goes from 5 minutes to 1 
day. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation within trading day. 
Panel A. RET 
Sampling frequency  5 min  10 min  30 min  1 hour  2 hour  1 day 
Lag RET  0.134  0.175  -0.051  -0.051  0.081  -0.087 
 (2.29)  (2.67)  (0.50)  (0.39)  (0.62)  (0.61) 
Lag RET +  -0.099  -0.112  0.169 0.178  -0.196  0.245 
 (1.21)  (1.16)  (1.37)  (1.21)  (1.13)  (1.34) 
Lag ΔTURNOVER 0.000  0.001  -0.001 0.002 -0.008  -0.010 
 (0.68)  (0.91)  (0.79)  (0.49)  (1.46)  (2.06) 
Panel B. ΔTURNOVER 
Sampling frequency  5 min  10 min  30 min  1 hour  2 hour  1 day 
Lag RET  1.168  1.140  0.968  1.308  0.274  -0.339 
  (3.47) (4.43)  (2.83) (3.90) (0.90) (0.65) 
Lag RET +  -1.419  -1.386  -1.060 -1.834 -0.174 0.571 
  (2.16) (3.65)  (3.56) (4.74) (0.53) (0.92) 
Lag ΔTURNOVER -0.145  -0.146  -0.154 -0.124 -0.171 -0.143 
  (9.61) (9.71) (11.58) (8.29) (3.57) (2.90) 
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Table 8. Momentum profits 
This table shows the ex-post returns of warrant portfolios sorted on lagged returns for warrants with the same 
number of trading days remaining during the zero-fundamental sample (defined as Black-Scholes value less than 
0.0005, half of the minimum trading tick). Ex-post returns are reported for warrants whose lagged returns are 
above/below median (panel A), in the top/bottom quartiles (panel B), and positive/negative (panel C). In panel C, 
those sorts when all lagged returns are positive/negative are excluded. The return horizon ranges from 5 minutes to 
1day. The t-statistics are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and correlation within trading day. 
 
Panel A. Return of portfolios sorted on lagged return (top half vs. bottom half) 
Return horizon  5 min  10 min  30 min  1 hour  2 hour  1 day 
Winner -0.0005  -0.0001  -0.0012 -0.0026 -0.0031 -0.0058 
(Top  half)  (1.95) (0.13) (0.74) (0.96) (0.67) (0.68) 
Loser  -0.0004 -0.0015 -0.0029 -0.0057 -0.0108 -0.0178 
(Bottom  half)  (1.32) (2.80) (2.39) (2.44) (2.67) (2.36) 
 
Panel B. Return of portfolios sorted on lagged return (top quartile vs. bottom quartile) 
Return horizon  5 min  10 min  30 min  1 hour  2 hour  1 day 
Winner -0.0004  0.0002  -0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0019 -0.0046 
(Top  quartile)  (1.72) (0.28) (0.30) (0.38) (0.40) (0.50) 
Loser  -0.0003 -0.0017 -0.0033 -0.0059 -0.0085 -0.0146 
(Bottom quartile)  (1.03)  (3.27)  (2.72) (2.60) (1.95) (1.58) 
 
Panel C. Return of portfolios sorted on lagged return (positive vs. negative lagged return) 
Return horizon  5 min  10 min  30 min  1 hour  2 hour  1 day 
Winner -0.0005  -0.0005  -0.0007 -0.0023 -0.0037 -0.0130 
(Positive  return)  (2.54) (0.76) (0.36) (0.74) (0.70) (1.30) 
Loser  -0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0034 -0.0072 -0.0118 -0.0199 
(Negative  return)  (1.38) (2.61) (2.19) (2.84) (2.69) (2.02) 
 